Portfolios often trade at substantial discounts relative to the sum of their components (e.g., closed-end funds). We propose a simple, unifying explanation for this phenomenon: Investors often disagree about the value of each individual component. However, as long as their relative views are not perfectly and positively correlated, disagreement partially offsets at the portfolio level. That is, investors generally disagree less at the portfolio level than at the individual component level. Coupled with short-sale constraints, this channel provides an explanation for why portfolios often trade below the sum of its parts. Utilizing closed-end funds, exchangetraded funds, conglomerates, and mergers and acquisitions as settings where prices of the underlying components and prices of the aggregate portfolio can be separately evaluated, we present evidence supportive of our argument. JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G20
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Introduction
Portfolios often trade at substantial discounts relative to the sum of their components.
Examples range from closed-end funds, where the value of the fund generally falls below the value of its underlying assets (e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991) , to conglomerate firms, where the valuation ratio of the multi-segment conglomerate generally is below that of its single-segment counterparts (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994) . In this paper, we propose a simple and unifying explanation for these seemingly unrelated phenomena.
Specifically, we build on the notion that even if investors disagree strongly about the value of the individual components, as long as the relative views are not perfectly and positively correlated across these components, disagreement partially offsets at the aggregate portfolio level. Coupled with short-sale constraints, the smaller disagreement at the portfolio level translates into a lower portfolio value relative to the sum of the individual component values.
To illustrate by example, consider a setting of two investors, A and B, and two assets, S X and S Y . Investors A and B disagree at the component level. In particular, investor A believes that the fair prices for S X and S Y are $10 and $5, respectively. The valuation is reversed for investor B, who believes that the fair prices for S X and S Y are $5 and $10, respectively. Investor A's and investor B's beliefs "cross" in such a way that although the two disagree about the value of the individual components, they are in perfect agreement regarding the portfolio value ($10+$5 = $5+$10 = $15).
In the presence of binding short-sale constraints, the market price will reflect the valuation of the optimist and shares of S X and S Y will both trade at $10. A portfolio containing one share of S X and one share of S Y will, thus, have a net asset value of $20 despite investors' agreement on the overall portfolio value of $15. If the portfolio's underlying assets and the portfolio are traded separately, we will observe a discount in the value of the portfolio relative to the value of the underlying assets.
This discount should strengthen with the level of disagreement about the value of the underlying assets: If investors A and B hold similar beliefs about the value of each asset (e.g., S X =$7.55 versus S X =$7.45), the fact that investors' beliefs partially offset at the portfolio level is of little practical consequence (Prediction 1).
The effect of disagreement on portfolio discount should also strengthen with the degree to which investor A's and investor B's beliefs cross: If the same investor holds the most optimistic belief across all assets (e.g., investor A believes that both S X and S Y are worth $10 and investor B believes both assets should be priced at $5), then both the value of each component and the value of the overall portfolio are determined by the same investor and there is no discrepancy between the value of the whole and the sum of its parts (Prediction 2).
We identify closed-end funds (CEFs) as our first setting to assess the relevance of our propositions.
1 CEFs are corporations holding a portfolio of securities. Both the CEF and the shares held by the fund are traded on stock exchanges. To the extent that disagreement at the individual security level partially offsets at the portfolio level and short-sale constraints are binding, we expect the fund's market value to be below the value of the fund's underlying assets. This discount should vary with the level of disagreement about the fund's underlying assets and the degree to which beliefs cross.
We approximate investor disagreement and belief crossing via analyst earnings forecasts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher disagreement among the CEF's underlying assets generally increases the discount between the value of the fund and that of its underlying holdings. In addition, the effect of disagreement on CEF discount strengthens with the degree to which beliefs cross. The results are robust to using either the level of crossing or the change in crossing.
Our second setting considers exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Similar to CEFs, ETFs are investment companies holding portfolios of securities, whereby both the ETF and the shares held by the ETF are traded on stock exchanges. As with CEFs, the market price of an ETF can differ from the value of its underlying assets, although the magnitude of this disparity is much smaller for ETFs than for CEFs due to the presence of authorized participants, who can create and redeem large blocks of the ETF's underlying holdings.
As with CEFs, we find that the ETF discount increases with the level of disagreement about the fund's underlying assets. This effect increases with our measure of relative belief crossing. Moreover, consistent with the notion that authorized participants create or redeem ETF shares to level the fund value with the underlying portfolio value, we find that higher relative belief crossing ( the ETF share is cheap relative to the underlying portfolio) is associated with more redemption of ETF shares.
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Our observations carry over to the settings of conglomerates and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Conglomerates are corporations operating in multiple industry segments. When comparing the valuation ratio of a conglomerate (i.e., "the portfolio value") to the sales-weighted average valuation ratio of the industries that the conglomerate operates in (i.e., "the sum of the individual component values"), the 2 We find a similarly negative effect of belief crossing on (open-end) mutual fund flows.
literature notes that the former generally falls below the latter, a phenomenon referred to as the diversification discount (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994) .
Our mechanism provides a partial explanation for this phenomenon. 3 To the extent that disagreement at the individual industry level partially offsets at the conglomerate level, the valuation ratio of the conglomerate should be below the salesweighted average industry valuation ratio. This diversification discount should increase with the level of disagreement about the conglomerate's underlying industry segments.
To test this hypothesis, we (again) approximate investor disagreement via analyst earnings forecast dispersion. We focus on pure industry players (i.e., singlesegment firms) to compute the average valuation ratio and average forecast dispersion for each industry. Consistent with Prediction 1, we find that disagreement about the conglomerate's underlying segments positively relates to the diversification discount.
Theoretically, the positive relation between disagreement and diversification discount should strengthen with the degree of industry belief crossing. However, since brokerages do not issue earnings forecasts for individual industry segments, we are unable to construct the belief-crossing measure for conglomerates and, hence, test Prediction 2.
To remedy this, we turn to the setting of M&As. We focus on the combined announcement day return of the acquirer and target, which reflects, among others, the difference between the value of the joint firm (i.e., "the portfolio value") and the sum of the value of the acquirer and the target operating separately (i.e., "the sum of the individual component values"). If disagreement at the acquirer/target level partially offsets at the joint firm level, we expect this channel to have a negative effect on the combined announcement day return. Holding all else equal, this negative effect should strengthen with the level of disagreement and the degree of relative belief crossing.
Consistent with these conjectures, we observe that the combined announcement day return indeed decreases with the average forecast dispersion for the acquirer and target. This pattern is particularly strong when the most optimistic investor for the acquirer is not among the most optimistic ones for the target, i.e., when relative beliefs for the acquirer and target cross. In the extreme case in which the most optimistic investors for the acquirer hold the most pessimistic view for the target, the combined M&A announcement return can be substantially negative.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 places our study in the literature. Section 3 describes the data and our main variables of interest. Section 4 presents our baseline findings and Section 5 presents results of additional analyses.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Background and Contribution
Over the past decades, a large body of empirical work has uncovered patterns in average stock returns that are difficult to explain with traditional asset-pricing models. As a result, behavioral and friction-based models, which depart from the traditional assumptions of perfect investor rationality and frictionless markets, have become an oft proposed alternative (Hirshleifer, 2001; Barberis and Thaler, 2005) .
One such class of models, referred to as "disagreement models," has received particular attention. At their core, disagreement models presume that investor beliefs 6 are correct, on average, but that investors agree to disagree (due to, for example, overconfidence). In addition, some investors cannot or will not short-sell (Miller, 1977; Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong and Stein, 2007 ). An investor, who thinks that a given stock is overvalued, therefore, does not bet against it, but rather sits out of the market. Because, in this setting, market prices are determined by the optimists, prices are generally upward biased. Moreover, prices go up if the optimists become more optimistic, even if at the same time, the pessimists become more pessimistic. That is, holding investors' average belief constant, the upward bias in the stock price increases with the level of investor disagreement. Subsequent work assessing this prediction finds that stocks with higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion, and those experiencing reductions in mutual fund ownership breadth (thus, more investors sitting out of the market), indeed, earn lower returns subsequently (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002; Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002) .
While the existing evidence is consistent with models of investor disagreement and short-sale constraints, alternative interpretations remain. For example, investors tend to disagree more about firms that have many growth opportunities than about firms with mostly assets in place. Thus, one may argue that it is the exercise of growth options, rather than investor disagreement, which leads to the observed lower future returns (Johnson, 2004) . In addition, valuation uncertainty tends to increase investor disagreement and strengthen behavioral biases, in particular over-optimism (Einhorn, 1980; Hirshleifer, 2001) . Over-optimism, in turn, can lead to lower future returns.
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Unlike the disagreement model, these alternative frameworks do not rely on short-sale constraints and imply that any relaxation of short-sale constraints has little impact on security prices. Corroborating this view, a growing literature (e.g., Asquith, Pathak and Ritter, 2005; Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008; Kaplan, Moskowitz and Sensoy, 2013) provides evidence that the practical relevance of short-sale constraints may have been overemphasized and that few stocks are meaningfully short-sale constrained.
In this paper, we distinguish the disagreement model from alternative interpretations tied to growth options and investor optimism by deriving an implication that is unique to the disagreement/short-sale constraint framework. In particular, our empirical design builds on the simple proposition that the most optimistic investor for stock X need not necessarily also hold the most optimistic view for stock Y; that is, investor beliefs sometimes cross at the component level and partially offset at the portfolio level.
Our empirical strategy, then, is to compare two sets of nearly identical, yet separately traded securities: the aggregate portfolio and its underlying components.
While being close substitutes, these two sets of securities differ importantly along the dimension of investor disagreement. As such, our approach provides a relatively clean and powerful setting to test the relevance of investor disagreement and short-sale constraints in determining asset prices.
Our evidence, based on all four empirical settings, suggests that short-sales constraints can have a material impact on asset prices and expected returns. That said,
we do not take a stance on whether the relaxation of short-sale constraints improves market efficiency. The latter also depends on how investor disagreement interacts/correlates with other frictions and biases in the market. For example, if investors are, on average, overly pessimistic when they disagree, then the value assigned by the optimists may be closer to the true fundamental value, and the relaxation of short-sale constraints may not necessarily enhance price efficiency.
Another key contribution of our paper is to provide a unifying explanation for a number of seemingly unrelated asset pricing phenomena -the CEF discount, the ETF discount, conglomerate firm discount, and substantial variation in M&A announcement day returns, which have garnered much attention in both empirical and theoretical research. While prior studies have generally attributed these patterns to time-varying investor sentiment, agency issues, and merger synergies, we argue that they are, at least partially, driven by a common mechanism: investor disagreement that partially offsets at the portfolio level.
Data and Variables
In this section, we introduce our sample and the dependent variable -the premium/discount of the value of the portfolio relative to that of its underlying components, in the settings of CEFs (Section 3.1), ETFs (Section 3.2), conglomerates (Section 3.3) and M&As (Section 3.4). We discuss our main independent variablesinvestor disagreement and belief crossing -in Section 3.5. To facilitate interpretation, all independent variables in the regressions are normalized to have a standard deviation of one.
Closed-End Funds
Our first set of analyses focuses on US Equity CEFs. 5 CEFs are publicly traded companies. Rather than using the proceeds from the initial public offering (IPO) and subsequent seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) to invest in physical assets, these companies acquire a portfolio of equity securities. Because the CEF itself is traded on a stock exchange, we can compare the market value of the fund against the market value of the CEF's underlying holdings. We include in our sample CEFs with data necessary to construct the CEF discount and the following independent variables: Disagreement, Crossing, Inverse Price, Dividend Yield, Liquidity Ratio, Expense Ratio, Excess
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Excess Skewness. All these variables are defined in Section 3.5 and in Appendix Table A1 . Weekly CEF premia / (discounts) are calculated using closing prices and net asset values (NAV) as reported in LIPPER:
As shown in Table 1 , the average CEF discount in our sample is 5.9%; the standard deviation is 11.4%. These numbers are similar to those reported in prior studies (e.g., 5 Going forward, we use the terms CEF and US Equity CEF interchangeably. Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee, 1995; Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman, 1998; Chan, Jain, and Xia, 2008; Hwang, 2011) .
Exchange-Traded Funds
ETFs are similar to CEFs in that both the fund and the fund's underlying holdings are traded separately in stock exchanges. The market value of an ETF sometimes differs from the combined value of its underlying assets, although the magnitude of this disparity is much smaller for ETFs than for CEFs due to the presence of authorized participants, who can create and redeem large blocks of the ETF's underlying holdings.
Our data sources for ETFs are again LIPPER and MORNINGSTAR. We include in our sample US Equity ETFs with data necessary to construct the ETF discount and the same set of independent variables as in the CEF setting. 6 Due to data constraints, our variables are measured at a monthly frequency and they are defined in Section 3.5 and in Appendix Table A1 .
For ETFs, we have data available from 2003 to 2012 and our sample consists of 383 ETFs. As reported in Table 1 , the average ETF discount in our sample is 1bp, with a standard deviation of 38bp. These figures are in line with prior research on ETF discounts (e.g., Petajisto, 2013) . While the discount is small in percentage terms, given the size of the ETF industry, it is large in dollar terms.
Conglomerates are firms operating in multiple industry segments. Our conglomerate sample consists of all firms that possess the data necessary to construct the "diversification discount" variable and the following independent variables: Disagreement, Total Assets, Leverage, Profitability, Investment Ratio, Excess
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Excess Skewness, all of which are defined in Section 3.5 and in Appendix Table A1 . The variables are measured at an annual frequency. The sample period is 1978-2012. Our data sources are CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
The diversification discount is the difference between the conglomerate's marketto-book ratio (MB) and its imputed MB, scaled by the latter.
We use information in June as of calendar year t to compute the market value of equity and we use accounting data from the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year t-1 to compute the book value of equity. To construct the imputed MB, we first compute the average MB for each two-digit-SIC-code industry, Industry-MB; we use single- The Combined Announcement Day Return is the average cumulative abnormal return over [-1,+1] across the acquirer and the target, weighted by the acquirer's and target's market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement:
where t=0 is the day (or the ensuing trading day) of the acquisition announcement.
Following prior literature, we use DGTW adjusted returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997) to compute CAR. The average combined announcement day return in our sample is 1.7% with a standard deviation of 7.4%.
Disagreement and Crossing
In the introduction, we present a setting of two investors, A and B, and two assets, S X and S Y . In the extreme case where short-sale constraints are binding and the most optimistic investor for stock X (S X = $10) also is the most optimistic investor for stock Y (S Y = $10), no discount should be observed between the price offered for the overall portfolio (=$20) and the value of the portfolio's underlying assets (=$20) as both are determined by the same investor. This contrasts with the other extreme where investors' beliefs cross and the most optimistic investor for stock X (S X = $10) is the most pessimistic investor for stock Y (S Y = $5); here, we observe a $5 discount between the value of the overall portfolio, which both investors believe to be $15, and the value of the portfolio's underlying assets, which is determined by the most optimistic investors and thus equals $20. In reality, investors' belief ranking across assets likely is somewhere between these two extremes (i.e., neither perfectly positively, nor perfectly negatively correlated across assets).
To test for our proposed mechanism, we require both a measure of investor disagreement and a measure of investor belief crossing for each pair of stocks. Our study approximates investor beliefs via analysts' earnings forecasts.
One concern regarding our empirical approach is that analyst disagreement and analyst belief crossing may not be representative of investor disagreement and investor belief crossing. A related concern is that, in order to construct our Crossing variable, we need a pair of stocks to be covered by at least two common analysts; yet, in practice, most analysts focus on stocks from one or two industries.
We speak to both concerns by computing our measures at the brokerage level (in robustness checks, we also report results using analyst-level measures). Constructing our measures at the brokerage level has two advantages. Consider the following example:
Example of stock coverage by analyst and brokerage firm.
Given that most investors, including institutions, deal with a small number of brokers for trade execution, it is plausible that investors rely more on information provided by some brokerage firms than others. In the example above, Morgan Stanley is more optimistic than Goldman Sachs about the value of Stock A and B. It is conceivable that investors paying more attention to Morgan Stanley's sell-side research also will be more optimistic than investors paying more attention to Goldman Sachs' research. If so, disagreement (belief crossing) measured at the brokerage level provides useful information about the level of disagreement (belief crossing) among investors.
Note that we need not take a stand on the direction of information flow, i. Our focus on brokerages also facilitates the construction of the Crossing variable.
In practice, few stock pairs from a diversified portfolio are covered by the same two (or more) analysts (as few analysts cover stocks from unrelated industries). On the other hand, brokerage firms tend to cover a wide range of stocks through the simultaneous employment of multiple analysts. In the previous example, to the extent that some investors communicate more with Morgan Stanley while others communicate more with Goldman Sachs, the degree to which Morgan Stanley's and Goldman Sachs' beliefs cross provides an indication about the level of belief crossing of the underlying investor population.
Our proposition still goes through even if the set of investors holding the underlying assets is different from the set of investors holding the overall portfolio. As long as the various investor groups all rely, to some degree, on the reports produced by the brokerages, the level of belief crossing at the brokerage level still provides a representative picture of the level of belief crossing of the overall investor population; as such, the fact that different assets may be held by different investors becomes less critical in our interpretation of the results. To compute Disagreement for CEFs and ETFs, we begin with data on portfolio holdings from MORNINGSTAR. In most cases, portfolio holdings are reported every three months for CEFs and every one month for ETFs. We match portfolio holdings data reported at the end of month t with CEF and ETF discounts in the following month(s).
For each stock j held by CEF (ETF) i as of t, we compute the price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion, Dispersion i,j,t as
where Forecast(EPS) k,j,t is brokerage k's most recent forecast for quarterly earnings-pershare of firm j. Because each brokerage firm only assigns one of its analysts to cover stock j, brokerage earnings forecast dispersion is equivalent to analyst earnings forecast dispersion. (However, brokerage-level belief crossing is not equivalent to analyst-level belief crossing.) We require forecasts to be made in the 90 day period prior to the earnings announcement date and we require the earnings announcement date to be within 90 days prior to the portfolio holdings date t. P j,t is the price-per-share for firm j as of the end of the corresponding fiscal quarter.
We compute Disagreement i,t as the portfolio-weighted average dispersion across all stocks held by CEF (ETF) i as of t.
7 In additional tests, we re-estimate our primary regression equations for the subset of observations for which the CEFs' (ETFs') underlying assets are primarily held by retail investors. That is, we focus on a subset of observations for which there is greater overlap between investors pricing the underlying assets and investors pricing the overall portfolio. Our results are virtually unchanged.
To ensure that any variation in Disagreement does not reflect lack of data on earnings forecasts, we compute weights, w i,j,t , with respect to stocks that have Dispersion data only. 8 Our results remain similar if we use portfolio weights as a fraction of total net assets. We truncate the absolute value of Disagreement at the 99 th percentile.
To construct our crossing variable, we first compute the pairwise correlation for each stock pair (j, l) held by CEF (ETF) i as of t, covered by a common brokerage house h:
Corr denotes the Spearman rank correlation, h is the list of brokerages that cover both j and l. Intuitively, when the most optimistic investor of stock j also is the most optimistic investor for stock l ("no belief crossing"), the pairwise correlation gravitates towards one. In contrast, when the most optimistic investor of stock j is the most pessimistic investor for stock l ("belief crossing"), the pairwise correlation gravitates towards negative one. Crossing, then, is the portfolio-weighted average pairwise correlation across all stock pairs, multiplied by negative one:
A larger Crossing i,t , thus, implies a higher level of investor belief crossing.
Disagreement and Crossing -Conglomerates
As with CEFs and ETFs, we rely on price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion to approximate investor disagreement. We focus on single-segment firms and compute the average forecast dispersion for each two-digit-SIC-code industry as of t. We compute Disagreement i,t as the sales-weighted average dispersion across all segments in which conglomerate i operates as of year t.
Our main dependent and independent variable, Premium i,t and Disagreement i,t , are measured at the annual/conglomerate level. Recall that when calculating Premium i,t ,
we use information in June as of calendar year t to compute the market value of equity and we use accounting data from the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year t-1 to compute the book value of equity. Earnings forecasts used to construct Disagreement i,t are for annual earnings for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1.
Disagreement and Crossing -M&As
As before, we use price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion to approximate investor disagreement. We compute Disagreement i,t as the average dispersion of the acquirer and target in M&A event i at time t, weighted by the acquirer's and target's market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement:
We use the brokerages' most recent forecast for annual earnings-per-share. We require the earnings announcement date to be within 90 days prior to the M&A date t.
To construct our Crossing variable, we compile a list of brokerage houses that cover both the acquirer and target prior to the M&A announcement date and compute the Spearman rank correlation in earnings forecasts between the acquirer and the target, multiplied by negative one. Again, a higher value of Crossing implies a higher level of investor belief crossing.
Baseline Results
In this section, we start by presenting baseline results for CEFs and ETFs. We then extend our analyses to conglomerate firms and to M&As.
Closed-End Funds
We begin our analysis with CEFs, for which we have weekly price data. We estimate a pooled OLS regression with year-week fixed effects. The dependent variable is the weekly CEF discount. The independent variable of primary interest is our measure of investor disagreement across the CEF's underlying assets, Disagreement. Control variables include Inverse Price, Dividend Yield, Liquidity Ratio, Expense Ratio, Excess
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Excess Skewness. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered along two dimensions: the CEF level and year-week level.
As reported in Column 1 of Table 2 , after controlling for variables that are known to be related to CEF discounts, the coefficient on Disagreement equals -0.005 (insignificant). This estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in Disagreement leads to a 50bp increase in the discount. Relative to the average CEF discount of 5.9%, this increase represents an 8% jump.
The insignificant effect may not surprise as investor disagreement only affects prices if beliefs cross. In Column 2, we re-estimate our main regression equation, but now add the following two terms: Crossing and Crossing interacted with Disagreement.
As shown in Column 2, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is -0.001 and statistically significant. This implies that when Crossing is high -i.e., the most optimistic investor for stock j tends to not be the most optimistic investor for stock lan increase in disagreement has a substantially larger negative effect on prices. For example, for CEFs in the top quintile of the Crossing measure, a one-standard-deviation increase in Disagreement is now associated with a 77bp increase in the CEF discount.
Exchange-Traded Funds
We conduct analogous tests for ETFs. Due to data availability, our dependent and independent variables are now at an ETF/year-month level. We thus estimate a pooled OLS regression with year-month fixed effects. The dependent variable is the monthly ETF discount. The independent variables include Disagreement, Crossing, Inverse Price, Dividend Yield, Liquidity Ratio, Expense Ratio, Excess Idiosyncratic Volatility and Excess Skewness. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at both the fund and year-month levels.
As reported in Column 1 of Table 3 , the coefficient on Disagreement is -0.001 and statistically insignificant. In Column 2, we report results when including Crossing and an interaction term between Crossing and Disagreement. We observe that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is -0.005 (t-statistic = -3.13). The estimates imply that for ETFs in the top quintile based on the Crossing measure, a one-standard-deviation increase in Disagreement is associated with a 0.5bp increase in the ETF discount. For reference, the average ETF discount in our sample is about 1bp.
We next extend our analysis to the setting of conglomerate firms. Following prior literature (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994) , we estimate both a pooled OLS regression with year fixed effects and a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. The dependent variable is the annual conglomerate firm discount. The independent variable of interest is the salesweighted average industry disagreement. Other independent variables include the log total assets (and its square), leverage ratio, profitability (earnings divided by sales), investment ratio, excess idiosyncratic volatility, and excess skewness. T-statistics in the pooled OLS regression are computed using standard errors clustered at both the firm and year levels. T-statistics in the Fama-MacBeth regression are computed using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with one lag.
As shown in Table 4 , the coefficient estimate on Disagreement is -0.028 (tstatistic = -4.42) in the pooled OLS setting; in the Fama-MacBeth setting, the estimate is -0.047 (t-statistic = -3.49). These estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in Disagreement is associated with a 2.8% to 4.7% increase in the conglomerate firm discount. Relative to the average conglomerate discount of 23.8% in our sample, this increase represents an 11.8% to 19.7% jump.
Mergers and Acquisitions
Since brokerages do not issue earnings forecasts for individual industry segments, we are unable to compute our Crossing measure for conglomerate firms. For this reason, we conduct a more direct test of our mechanism in a related setting, that of M&As.
Specifically, we ask the question of how the combined announcement day return of the acquirer and target is related to investor disagreement and the level of belief crossing. The combined announcement day return reflects, among other things, the difference between the value of the joint firm (i.e., "the portfolio value") and the sum of the value of the acquirer and target operating separately (i.e., "the sum of the individual components"). If disagreement at the acquirer/target level partially offsets at the joint firm level, we expect this channel to lower the combined announcement day return. The magnitude of this negative return effect should be a function of the average level of disagreement about the acquirer and target, as well as the degree to which investors' relative beliefs cross.
We estimate a pooled OLS regression with year fixed effects across the 938 M&A transactions that meet our data requirements. The dependent variable is the combined announcement day return for each M&A transaction. The independent variables include Disagreement, Crossing, as well as total assets, market-to-book ratio, ROA and inverse price of both the acquirer and the target. We also control for deal characteristics, such as RelativeSize, TenderOffer, HostileOffer, CompetingOffer, CashOnly, StockOnly, a same-industry indicator, combined idiosyncratic volatility and combined skewness. Tstatistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the year level.
As shown in Table 5 , after controlling for variables that are known to relate to synergies, the coefficient on Disagreement equals -0.011 (t-statistic = -3.18), implying that a one-standard-deviation increase in Disagreement is associated with a 1.1% decrease in combined announcement day returns. In further tests, we include Crossing and an interaction term between Crossing and Disagreement. We observe a coefficient estimate of -0.010 (t-statistic = -2.35) on the interaction term. These results suggest that the degree to which the value of the combined company is below the sum of the acquirer and target increases with investor disagreement; this relation is particular strong when the most optimistic investor for the acquirer tends to not be among the most optimistic for the target, i.e., when investors' relative beliefs cross.
Embedded Belief Crossing and Additional Analyses
We conduct a number of additional analyses. First, we construct an embedded measure of belief crossing for portfolios with more than two securities. Second, we directly examine the effect of short-sale constraints on our proposed mechanism by incorporating short-selling costs into our measure. Third, we report results based on belief crossing at the analyst level. Fourth, we examine how belief dispersion and crossing affect capital flows to ETFs and, as an extension, to open-end mutual funds. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that firm managers are, at least partially, aware of the valuation effect of investor belief dispersion and time their merger transactions accordingly.
Embedded Belief Crossing
While the Crossing variable constructed in the previous section (along with the interaction term with Disagreement) has an intuitive interpretation, it misses an important aspect of belief crossing for portfolios with more than two securities. Consider a portfolio with equal weights in three stocks, X, Y, and Z. Assume X and Y have high belief dispersion, but little relative belief crossing. In contrast, security Z has little belief dispersion, yet large relative belief crossing vis-a-vis both securities X and Y. In situations we have a "mismatch" like in the example above, our current Disagreement and Crossing variables will tend to overstate the level of dispersion and the degree of belief crossing and, as a result, erroneously suggest that the portfolio should trade at a substantial discount relative to its underlying assets.
To more precisely capture our mechanism, we construct a measure of embedded belief crossing for which we interact crossing and dispersion at the pair level and then aggregate to the portfolio level. We first compute the pairwise "covariance" for each stock pair (j, l) in portfolio i as of t, covered by at least two common brokerage houses:
where Corr denotes the Spearman rank correlation across all brokerage firms that cover the two stocks. We then aggregate this to InvCov, defined as the portfolio-weighted average Pairwise Covariance across all stock pairs, multiplied by negative one:
We then repeat our analyses from Section 4, but now replace the interaction term between Crossing and Disagreement with InvCov. We start with CEFs. The coefficient estimate on InvCov of -0.003 (t-statistic = -2.06), reported in Column 1 of Table 6, implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in InvCov comes with a 30bp increase in the CEF discount. We observe a similar pattern for ETFs. As can be seen in Column 2 of the same table, the coefficient estimate on InvCov equals -0.006(t-statistic = -2.75),
suggesting that a one-standard-deviation increase in InvCov is associated with a 0.6bp increase in the ETF discount. Finally, as shown in Column 3, in our M&A setting, the coefficient estimate on InvCov is -0.012 (t-statistic = -2.32), implying that a onestandard-deviation increase in InvCov leads to 1.2% lower combined announcement day returns.
In columns 4 and 5, we repeat our analysis for CEFs and ETFs by focusing on changes in fund discounts as a function of changes in relative belief crossing. Our main results are robust to using changes as opposed to levels.
In sum, our results based on InvCov are consistent with, and in many cases stronger than those based on the interaction of Disagreement and Crossing, lending further support to our proposed mechanism.
Short-Sale Constraints
Returning to our example from the introduction, assume that there is an investor A, who believes that the fair prices for S X and S Y are $10 and $5, respectively, and also an investor B, who believes that stock prices for S X and S Y are $5 and $10, respectively. In the presence of binding short-sale constraints, the market price will solely reflect the valuation of the optimist and shares of S X and S Y will both trade at $10. A portfolio containing one share of S X and one share of S Y will, thus, be priced at $20 despite investors' agreement on the overall portfolio value of $15.
As short-sale constraints in the underlying assets X and Y ease, prices of S X and S Y will fall below those offered by the most optimistic investor; consequently, the discrepancy between the value of the underlying assets and the overall portfolio value of $15 will narrow.
Security-Level Short-Sale Constraints
To explore this idea, we measure short-sale constraints in the underlying assets using an extant proxy -one minus the fraction of shares held by institutions (hereafter referred to as (1-IO)). As shown by prior studies (e.g., Nagel, 2005) , institutional ownership is positively related to the supply of lendable shares, the increase in which can ease shortsale constraints. In additional tests, we also proxy for the degree of short-sale constraints using an interaction term between (1-IO) and short interest (SI), as stocks with lower supply of lendable shares and higher demand for shorting are perhaps most costly to sell short (Asquith, Pathak and Ritter, 2005) .
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For the same reason as the one described in Section 5.1, we embed our proxy for short-sale constraints directly into our InvCov measure. First, for each stock pair (j, l)
in portfolio i as of t, covered by at least two common brokerage houses, we define:
We then compute InvCov_IO as the portfolio-weighted average PairwiseCovariance_IO across all stock pairs, multiplied by negative one:
We embed the interaction of (1-IO) and SI into InvCov in a similar manner to derive InvCov_IOSI.
The results are reported in Table 7 . The dependent variables in the three columns are the CEF premium, the ETF premium, and the M&A combined announced day returns, respectively. The independent variable of primary interest is InvCov_IO.
After controlling for both InvCov and the portfolio-weighted average IO, the coefficient estimate on InvCov_IO in the CEF, ETF, and M&A samples are -0.002 (insignificant), -0.004 (t-statistic = -1.94), and -0.016 (t-statistic = -4.86), respectively. 10 These results 9 Short interest is the number of shares shorted divided by the number of shares outstanding. 10 We also proxy for short-sale constraints using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if institutional ownership is in the bottom tercile of its distribution, and zero otherwise. This is to capture are generally consistent with our prediction that the effect of belief dispersion and crossing on portfolio discounts is stronger when the short-sale constraints are more binding.
In columns 4-6, we repeat the same analysis using the interaction of (1-IO) and SI as a proxy for short-sale constraints. The results are similar to those reported in columns 1-3. The estimate on InvCov_IOSI are 0.000 (insignificant), -0.022 (t-statistic = -2.22) and -0.014 (t-statistic = -3.20) for the CEF, ETF and M&A samples, respectively.
As a robustness check, we also use the loan fee and fraction of lendable shares as measures of short sale constraints. We obtain both the loan fee and lendable shares data from a market maker specializing in the lending of small-cap stocks. 11 We are able to run this analysis only in the setting of CEFs, as some CEFs have fairly concentrated holdings in small-cap stocks. In a regression similar to that in Columns 1 and 4 of Table   7 , except that now we replace institutional ownership with loan fee and the fraction of lendable shares, we find that the coefficients on InvCov_LoanFee and
InvCov_LendableShares are -0.017 (t-statistic = -2.33) and -0.014 (t-statistic = -2.10), respectively (Appendix Table A2 ). These results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in InCov_LoanFee (InCov_LendableShares) leads to a 1.7% (1.4%) increase in the CEF discount.
the notion that institutional ownership may have a non-linear effect on short-sale constraints; in particular, short-sale constraints are only binding when institutional ownership is below some threshold.
The results are similar to those reported in Table 7 : the coefficients on InvCov_IODummy in the CEF, ETF, and M&A settings are -0.007 (t-statistic = -2.93), -0.004 (t-statistic = -1.40), and -0.013 (t-statistic = -2.61), respectively.
Portfolio-Level Short-Sale Constraints
Our focus thus far has been on short-sale constraints at the individual holdings level and how they may increase the portfolio discount. We next examine the impact of portfoliolevel short-sale constraints (i.e., constraints to short sell CEFs and ETFs) on our measures of fund discounts. CEF and ETF discounts should be smaller (or the premium should be larger) if short-sale constraints at the fund level are more binding.
To test this idea, we construct a variable that we label RelativeConstraint, defined as the difference in institutional ownership between the portfolio-weighted average of all underlying holdings and the fund itself. A large value of this measure implies that short-sale constraints are more binding at the fund level than at the holding level. As shown in Appendix Table A3 , a one standard-deviation increase in
RelativeConstraint lowers CEF and ETF discounts by 2.6% (t-statistic = 2.46) and 0.6bp (insignificant), respectively. In other words, for the average close-end fund in our sample, a 2.2 times standard deviation increase in RelativeConstraint will turn the CEF discount into a premium. Thus, the mechanism that we focus on in this paper -investor disagreement coupled with short sale constraints -can partially explain episodes of CEF premia as well.
Analyst-Level Crossing
While our baseline results are generated using crossing measures computed at the broker level, we also experiment with analyst-level data. In Table 8 , we report results for industry ETFs and within-industry M&As, where both Crossing and InvCov are computed across individual analysts. We focus on industry ETFs and within-industry M&As because analysts tend to specialize in a single industry and because in order to construct our Crossing variable, we need a pair of stocks to be covered by at least two common analysts. There are, unfortunately, no industry CEFs in our sample.
The empirical setup is identical to that in Tables 3, 5 , and 6, except that
Crossing and InvCov are now constructed at the analyst level. The first two columns include an interaction term between Disagreement and Crossing (similar to Tables 3 and 5) while the next two columns include the InvCov measure (similar to Table 6 ).
The results are similar to those shown above. For example, the coefficients on the interaction terms for the industry ETF and M&A samples are -0.011 (t-statistic = -3.03) and -0.015 (t-statistic = -2.69), respectively, which are of similar magnitudes to those reported in Tables 3 and 5 .
Fund Flows
One important reason that ETFs have a much smaller discount relative to CEFs is the presence of authorized participants, who can create and redeem large blocks of the ETF's underlying assets at relatively small costs. If authorized participants indeed create or redeem blocks of shares to take advantage of discrepancies between the fund value and the underlying portfolio value, we would expect capital flows to ETFs -i.e., the number of new shares created or the number of existing shares redeemed -to respond negatively to changes in belief dispersion and crossing. To illustrate, consider an increase in belief dispersion, which then leads to an increase in the fund discount.
Arbitrageurs in this case should buy ETF shares in the secondary market, redeem those shares, and sell the underlying portfolio to reap the sure profit. This amounts to an outflow to the ETF.
To test this prediction, we estimate a simple regression equation where the dependent variable is the monthly percentage flow to an ETF and the main independent variable is the change in the InvCov measure over the previous period.
12 As shown in Table 9 , after including lagged flows and returns, as well as the same set of control variables as in Table 3 , the coefficient estimate on Delta InvCov (at the broker level) is -0.001 (t-statistic = -9.93). This implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in Delta InvCov leads to a 10bp lower ETF flow in the next month.
In Appendix Table A4, 12 Flows to ETFs are defined as the percentage change in shares outstanding over two consecutive periods (e.g., Da and Shive, 2015) .
relative belief crossing, we would expect them to complete merger transactions in periods when belief crossing between the acquirer and target is unusually low (compared to historical levels).
13 Figure 1 plots the average InvCov across all merger transactions in our sample in event time from year = -5 to year = 0. We observe that InvCov is almost monotonically decreasing in the five years leading up to the merger. In a more formal test, we regress
InvCov on an event-time dummy and find a coefficient of -0.063 (t-statistic = -2.33).
This result is consistent with the notion that managers of the acquirer and target time their M&A transactions, in part, based on variation in investors' relative belief crossing.
Conclusion
This paper builds on the notion that even if investors disagree strongly about the value of the individual components, as long as the relative views are not perfectly and positively correlated across these components, disagreement partially offsets at the aggregate portfolio level. In the presence of binding short-sale constraints, this can cause the portfolio to trade at a discount relative to the sum of its components. This discount should increase with both the level of investor disagreement and the degree to which their relative views cross.
We take our prediction to the data. Utilizing CEFs, ETFs, conglomerates, and M&As as our empirical settings, where prices of the underlying components and prices of the aggregate portfolio can be separately evaluated, we provide evidence that the portfolio discount, indeed, is increasing with both the level of disagreement and the level of belief crossing.
Thus, by comparing two sets of nearly identical, yet separately traded securities:
the aggregate portfolio and its underlying components, we provide a relatively clean test of the relevance of investor disagreement and short-sale constraints in determining asset prices. Moreover, our paper provides a novel, unifying explanation for a number of seemingly unrelated asset pricing phenomena -the CEF discount, the ETF discount, the conglomerate firm discount, and substantial variation in M&A announcement day returns, which prior literature has tied to different mechanisms. This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of weekly closed-end fund (CEF) premia on a measure of disagreement about the fund's underlying assets. The dependent variable is the difference between the CEF's market price and the CEF's NAV, divided by the CEF's NAV. Disagreement i,t is the portfolio-weighted average price-scaled earnings forecast dispersion of the stocks held by CEF i as of t. To compute Crossing i,t , we consider all stocks that are held by the CEF. If two stocks are covered by more than two of the same brokerage houses, we compute the Spearman rank correlation between the earnings forecasts issued for each of these two stocks. Crossing i,t equals the portfolio-weighted average pairwise Spearman rank correlation, multiplied by negative one. All other independent variables are as described in Appendix Table A1 . All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Timefixed effects are included in all columns. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered along two dimensions (time level and fund level). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) covered by more than two of the same brokerage houses, we compute the Spearman rank correlation between the earnings forecasts issued for each of these two stocks. Crossing i,t equals the portfolio-weighted average pairwise Spearman rank correlation multiplied by negative one. All other independent variables are as described in Appendix Table A1 . All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Time-fixed effects are included in all columns. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered along two dimensions (time level and fund level). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) We use information in June of calendar year t to compute the market value of equity and we use accounting data from the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year t-1 to compute the book value of equity (and other control variables to be described). Earnings forecasts are for annual earnings with fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. All other independent variables are as described in Appendix Table A1 . All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. In Column (1), we estimate a panel regression with time-fixed effects; tstatistics are computed using standard errors clustered along two dimensions (time level and firm level).
In Column (2), we estimate a Fama-MacBeth regression; t-statistics are computed using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with one lag. The Adj. R 2 in Column (2) is the average Adj. R 2 of the crosssectional regressions. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) is an indicator of whether the acquirer and the target operate in the same two-digit SIC code. All other independent variables are as described in Appendix Table A1 . All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Time-fixed effects are included in all columns. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered at the time level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) InvCov i,t equals the portfolio-weighted average pairwise covariance, multiplied by negative one. In Columnd 2 and 4, Disagreement i,t is the average earnings forecast dispersion across the acquirer and the target, weighted by the acquirer's and target's market capitalization in the month prior to the announcement. Crossing i,t , is the Spearman rank correlation between earnings forecasts issued for the acquirer and those issued for the target, multiplied by negative one. InvCov i,t is the pairwise Spearman rank correlation, multiplied by the respective earnings forecast dispersions, multiplied by negative one. All other independent variables are as described in Appendix covered by more than two of the same brokerage houses, we compute the Spearman rank correlation between the earnings forecasts issued for each of these two stocks, and the pairwise covariance as the Spearman rank correlation, multiplied by the respective earnings forecast dispersions. Crossing i,t equals the portfolio-weighted average pairwise Spearman rank correlation, multiplied by negative one. InvCov i,t equals the portfolio-weighted average pairwise covariance, multiplied by negative one. Delta Crossing i,t and Delta InvCov i,t are the changes in Crossing and InvCov, respectively, over the previous month. LagReturns and LagFlows are four variables each, representing quarterly returns and fund flows over the previous four quarters. All other independent variables are as described in Appendix Table A1 . All independent variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Time-fixed effects are included in all columns. T-statistics are computed using standard errors clustered along two dimensions (time level and fund level). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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